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THE KOREAN RECONCILIATION TREATY AND THE
GERMAN BASIC TREATY:
COMPARABLE FOUNDATIONS FOR UNIFICATION?
Derek J. Vanderwood
Abstract: With the end of the Cold War, the North-South Korean relationship has
been the focus of increasing attention in the international community. In 1991, after
years of tense and hostile relations, the two states adopted the Korean Reconciliation
Treaty. To assess the prospects for successful reunification of the two Koreas through
the Treaty, this comment compares it with the German Basic Treaty of 1984, which
promotes similar goals of reunification of divided states. The comparison shows that the
German Treaty has been more successful in facilitating unification, due largely to its
relative flexibility in implementation. This comment proposes that the two Koreas might
achieve greater cooperation through more flexible implementation of the Reconciliation
Treaty, particularly with respect to its provisions on cross-border communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
The cold war ushered in a new era for both the Korean and German
nations. The common cultural and historical heritages shared by Koreans in
North and South Korea and Germans in East and West Germany were dis-
rupted by artificially created barriers of separation. The separation of the
previously unified countries was primarily due to the occupation and control
of the United States and the Soviet Union following World War II.
Although the divisions were intended to be temporary, the development of
governmental structures based upon ideologically opposite foundations
resulted in hostile and completely separate states. In an attempt to ease
cross-border tensions, both East and West Germany, and North and South
Korea pursued formal bilateral agreements. The results of these efforts were
the Basic Treaty between East and West Germany' and the Korean
Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and
Cooperation between the South and the North (Reconciliation Treaty). 2
A comparison of these treaties provides important insight into the fu-
ture North-South Korean relationship. The Reconciliation Treaty contains
specific provisions regarding travel, communications, and high level
I PoLmcs AND GovERNMENT IN THE FEDERAL REPuBLic oF GEIR ANY: BAsIc DOCUMENTS 382-87
(Carl-Cristoph Schwertzer et al. eds., 1984).
2 Full Text of Reconciliation Treaty, Kyodo News Service, Dec. 13, 1991, available in LEXIS,
ASIAPC Library; see also Source Material, 16 KoREA AND WORLD AFFAIRS 145-48 (Spring 1992).
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governmental contacts. Although the German Basic Treaty addressed these
same issues, reliance on flexible implementation allowed for a more
comprehensive adoption of the objectives. The Basic Treaty used
predominantly vague language to create a foundation for future agreement
which resulted in extensive cross-border contact. In contrast, North and
South Korea's Reconciliation Treaty plainly identifies the parameters of the
Treaty and establishes specific time periods for implementing the
provisions. Such specificity has hindered the effectiveness of the
Reconciliation Treaty. South Korea can contribute to inter-Korean contact
and create a basis for eventual unification by overlooking the Treaty's
specific language and instead adopting a flexible approach to Treaty
implementation. South Korea should focus on implementing the provisions
of the Reconciliation Treaty in order to achieve the cross-border contact and
cooperation necessary to eventually resolve the most difficult aspect of the
inter-Korean relationship: the nuclear weapon issue. Inter-Korean contact
and cooperation is a fundamental step required before unification can be
achieved.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. A Divided Korea
After being liberated from Japanese rule in 1945, Korea was divided
into two zones of occupation. 3 The regions were controlled by the Soviet
Union in the North, and the United States in the South.4 The division was
supposed to be temporary, but two antagonistic political units steadily
developed.5 The Soviet Union and the United States could not agree upon a
program for unification, and in 1948 two separate and independent states
were formally created.6
Hostility developed as the ideological rift between the two states so-
lidified.7 Communist control in the North reflected the influence of the
Soviet Union. In contrast, anti-Communist leaders gained control of the
government in the South.8 The Korean nation, which had been unified since
3 KOON WOO NAM, SOUTH KOREAN POLMCS: THE SEARCH FOR POLmCAL CONSENSUS AND
STABILrrY 1 (1988).
4 YONG SOON YN, Two KOREAS' UnFICATION POuCY & STRATEGY 5 (1978).
5 Tae-Hwan Kwak, Problems of Korean Political Integration: A Micro-Level Analysis in THE Two
KOREAS IN WORLD POLmCS 141, 142 (Tae-Hwan Kwak et al. eds., 1985).
6 NAM, supra note 3.
7 Id
8 1&. at2.
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the year 668,9 was divided into competing state structures due to cold war
forces beyond their control. 10 The Korean War (1950-53) further solidified
the division between North and South." Each state claimed to be the only
legitimate representative of the Korean nation, and pledged to seek
unification as quickly as possible. Each state would consider unification
only if completed in accordance with its own political philosophy. 12
Despite policy shifts by both North and South Korea over the last forty
years,13 the Korean states have existed across a tense divide with little direct
contact. 14
B. Korean Attempts to Improve Relations
The tense and hostile relationship between North and South Korea
showed signs of improvement in the early 1970s. 15 The first significant
breakthrough in the inter-Korean relationship occurred when the states
began formal talks and agreed to form a committee designed to promote
inter-Korean contact. The South-North Coordinating Committee was
created to achieve progress in the Korean relationship.16 The Committee
did succeed in issuing a Joint Communiqu6 which outlined areas of limited
cooperation.17 Despite this initial accomplishment, the Committee did not
achieve any of the intended goals, and the organization collapsed within two
years.' 8 South Korea blamed the North for attempting to use the Committee
as a means to achieve a South Korean communist revolution.19 Mutual
mistrust resulted in a renewed deterioration of the Korean relationship.
In 1991, however, the relationship entered a new phase. The primary
accomplishment of this new phase was the adoption of the Reconciliation
Treaty. The Treaty formalized the basis for future inter-Korean contact and
9 Se-Tn Kim, Introduction to KOREA: A DIVIDED NATION 3, 3 (Se-Jin Kim and Chang-hyan Cho
eds., 1976).
10 Kwaksupra note 5.
11 Kim, supra note 9, at 8-9.
12 Sang-Woo Rhee, Inter-Korean Relations in the 21st Century, 16 KOREA AND WORLD AFFAIRS 68,
71 (Spring 1992).
3 YIM, supra note 4, at 2.
14 Kwak, supra note 5, at 143.
15 YIM, supra note 4, at 29.
16 SE-JAN Kim, KOREAN UNIFICATION: SOURCE MATERIAS wITH AN INTRODUCrION 74 (Se-Jin Kim
ed., 1976).
17 NATIONAL UNIFICATION BOARD, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, A WHnrE PAPER ON SOuIH-NORTH
DIALOGUE IN KOREA 54 (1988).
18 KWAK, supra note 5, at 148-49.
19 Id.
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cooperation.20 The Reconciliation Treaty between North and South Korea
was the first bilateral treaty recognizing a mutual desire to promote inter-
Korean contact.21 The agreement allowed both states to acknowledge the
existence of separate and autonomous political units in the two Korean
states. The states agreed to pursue policies intended to overcome the effects
of division while creating a basis for cooperation. The Treaty marks a
significant development in the North-South Korean relationship, especially
considering the more than forty years of tense cross-border relations. 22
C. German Division
In many ways, the experience in North and South Korea is similar to
that in Germany. Following the end of World War H, Germany was divided
into four zones of occupation. One of the initial signs of political division
between the two German states was the development of separate political
parties. Shortly after the end of World War I, the communist party, with
substantial help from the Soviet Union, gained political control in East
Germany through the creation of the Socialist Unity Party (SED).23 The
party dominated all aspects of life in East Germany.24 By contrast, in West
Germany the occupying powers of France, Great Britain, and the United
States sought to guarantee the development of democratic political
institutions. 25 Three political parties developed in West Germany. The
parties were united in a common desire to counter communist influence.26
As a result, by the end of 1949, formal governmental structures had been
established in both East and West Germany.
The initial relationship between the two German states was marked by
hostility. Both West and East Germany claimed to be the sole representative
of the German nation. The West German government maintained that it
would not have relations with any country which recognized the existence
of East Germany.27 The policy was ineffective at achieving the intended
20 Dong-Won Lim, Inter-Korean Relations Oriented Toward Reconciliation and Cooperation 16
KOREA AND WORLD AFFAiRS 213,213 (Summer 1992).
21 Full Test of Reconciliation Treaty, supra note 2.
22 Se-Hyun Jeong, Legal Status and Political Meaning of the Basic Agreement between the South
and the North, 16 KOREA AND WoRWD AFAiRs 5, 5 (Spring 1992).
23 RODGER TILFORD, THE OsiPoLrm AND POLrrICAL CHANGE IN GERMANY 9 (Rodger Tilford ed.,
197524 DAVID CHI.DS, THE GDR: MOSCOW'S GERMAN ALLY 28-29 (1988).
25 WALTER LAQUER, EUROPE SINCE HrLER: THE REBIRTH OF EUROPE 92 (1982).
26 Id.
27 THuxORD, supra note 23, at 8.
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goal of isolating East Germany from the international community, but it did
contribute to the feeling of German division.28 East Germany sought
legitimacy by emphasizing that "the GDR is the fatherland of the nation."29
D. Improved German Relations
In the early 1970s, the West German government introduced a new
political relationship with the East.30 The new relationship between East
and West Germany resulted in policies that were intended to ease inter-
German tension and promote a basis for contact and cooperation. The West
German political leaders, led by the new chancellor Willy Brandt, concluded
that the division between the two German states could only be resolved
through mutual accommodation.3 1 The change in policy was intended to
establish a groundwork upon which closer relations with the German
Democratic Republic could eventually result in German reunification.
32
The change in policy resulted in the eventual adoption of bilateral
agreements. The primary inter-German agreement was entitled the Basic
Treaty between East and West Germany.33 The treaty allowed the states to
formally recognize the existence of two Germanies, and thereby minimize
many of the harsh realities of separation. By acknowledging the separation,
the two German states transcended their previous hostilities. As a result, the
states were able to adopt pragmatic agreements intended to ease the costs of
separation. The West German government realized that improvements in
the inter-German relationship would be modest in the short term, but
believed the Basic Treaty was crucial in establishing cooperation with East
Germany.
28 ERIc G. FREY, DIVISION AND DuTENTE: THBE GERMANIES AND THEIR ALLIANCEs 5 (1987).
29 Siegfried Kupper, Political Relations with the FRG, in GDR FOREIG'N POLICY 232, 267 (Eberhard
Schulz et al. eds., 1982).
30 The general term used to refer to these policies was Ostpolitik. The term included an effort to
improve and stabilize relations with East Germany, the Soviet Union, and Eastern European states. See
Melvin Croan, Dilemmas of Ostpolitik in West Germany in WEsT GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: DLEmMAS
AND DmCnONS 35, 35 (Peter H. Merkl ed., 1982).
31 Wolfram F. Hanreider and Graeme P. Huton, Reunification and Ostpolitik in THE FOREIGN
POLICIES OF WEST GERMANY, FRANCE, & BRrTAIN 50, 67 (1980).
32 WnLAM E. GRIFFIT, THE Os='oTnK HE FEDERAL REPUBIc OF GERMANY 176 (1978).
33 POLrCS AND GOvERNMENT IN THE FEDERAL REPuLic OF GERMANY: BASIC DOCUMENTs, supra
note 1.
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III. TREATY COMPARISON
A. West German Political Objectives
In order to create a new foundation for inter-German cooperation,
West Germany abandoned efforts to isolate East Germany in favor of
creating mechanisms for cross-border contact. The initial objectives were to
provide better inter-German transportation and postal arrangements, as well
as the reunification of family members.34 West Germany hoped the
improved relations would allow greater communication between Germans in
both countries.35 The policies were intended to establish a foundation for
future inter-German cooperation. 36 The Basic Treaty was a substantial
departure from previous West German policies. The goal was to circumvent
political separation by promoting both a common past and hope for a
common future.
Long-term West German objectives included the desire to solve the
artificial division of the German 'nation. West Germany hoped to allow
Germans in both states to "regain a form of cultural, economic, and social
unity and identity." 37 West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, stressed this
objective when he said,
The process of partition has also affected the ties
between the people. To partition was added separation. In this
situation, politics must help to facilitate and improve
communications between the people, so as to reinforce the will
to belong together and the awareness of so doing as a condition
for the survival of the German nation.38
The ultimate objective of the process was to provide the German
nation an opportunity to decide for itself if reunification was desired. West
German leaders were convinced that given the opportunity to decide, East
Germans would prefer the West German state system. Egon Bahr, the West
German State Secretary, said in 1972 that "the reunification of Germany
34 KENNM A. MEYERS. OSTPOLMKANDAMERICANSECURrYINTEREM IN EUROPE 8 (1972).
35 A. James McAdams, Explaining Inter-German Cooperation in the 1980s, DAAD SPECIAL ISSUE
GERMAN STUDmS REvmw 99,100 (1990).
36 Karl Cordell, The Basic Treaty Between the Two German States in Retrospect, 61 THE POLITCAL
QUARTERLY 36,41 (1990).
37 MYERS, supra note 34, at 10.
38 Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Intra-German Treaty Signed; An Important
Stage in Normalization Process, THE BU.ETIN, Jan. 9, 1973, at 3.
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remained the ultimate goal of Bonn's policy, even if this did not seem
possible in the foreseeable future." 39
Central to the long-term political objectives of the Federal Republic
was the continuing perception of a single German nation. Brandt claimed
that improving relations with the East would allow Germans in both states to
have increased contact and thus promote a common national identity. This
intention was identified in a speech on October 28, 1969:
The assignment of practical policy in the coming years is
to so preserve the unity of the nation that relations between the
parts of Germany can be freed from their present tension.
Germans are bound not only by language and history, with its
glory and its misery, but we are all at home in Germany.40
In reference to the signing of the Basic Treaty between East and West
Germany, Brandt said, "in the present situation this was the only way of pre-
serving the German nation and ties of culture, language and history that the
two German states have in common. '41
B. South Korean Political Objectives
The Reconciliation Treaty was a substantial departure from previous
South Korean policies.42 Although the South had attempted to improve
relations with the North through agreements in the early 1970s, the effort
was quickly abandoned.43 South Korea justified the abandonment by noting
North Korea had not given up the intention of achieving unification through
communist revolution in the South.44 The Reconciliation Treaty provided a
means for the South to promote contact and cooperation with the North and
thereby decrease the possibility of armed conflict, while creating a basis for
future understanding.45
39 Presse und Informationsmt der Bundesregierung, Bonn's Standpoint on Divided Germany's,
Including GDR's Role, T1 BUt.ETIN, June 13, 1972, at 158.
4 Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregienmg, Bundestag Speech, T-E BuLLETIN, Oct. 28,
1969, at 11.
41 Presse und lnformationsamt der Bundesregierung, supra note 38.
42 Jeong, supra note 22, at 5.
43 NATIONAL UN]FCATION BOARD, REPuBLic OF KOREA, A WHITE PAPER ON Soum-NoRTH
DIALoGUEiN KOREA 33 (1977).
44 Kim, supra note 9, at 25.
45 Young Whan Kihl, New Environment and Context for Korean Reunification; 16 KOREA AND
WORLD AFFAIS 621, 626 (Winter 1992).
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Many of the South Korean government objectives are similar to those
of West Germany in adopting the Basic Treaty. South Korean leaders
viewed the treaty as a means to promote a common national identity with
the North Korean populace.46 Indeed, "through increased interaction
between the peoples of the two Koreas, a sense of national unity will be
enhanced." 47 Unification of Korea has beenan important political objective,
and efforts to promote contact and cooperation have been viewed as an
essential means to achieve eventual unification.48 By the end of the 1980s,
the South Korean government began a new phase of foreign policy intended
to alter the inter-Korean relationship. South Korea sought to establish
relations with North Korea's historical supporters, the Soviet Union and
China, in order to ensure a more cooperative North Korea. 49 These efforts
have seemed to be effective, because the North has been more receptive to
establishing contact with the South.
IV. TREATY PROVISIONS
A. Basic Treaty
The Basic Treaty is composed of ten articles, along with attached sup-
plementary protocols enumerating more specific agreements.50 Although
the agreements involved a number of significant points, this analysis will
focus on the most influential of these provisions: travel, communications,
and governmental contact.
The primary aspect of the treaty effecting inter-German cooperation
was Article 7. The article identified the "readiness to regulate practical and
humanitarian questions in the process of the normalization" of relations.
The states agreed to "conclude agreements with a view to developing and
promoting on the basis of the present treaty and for their mutual benefit co-
operation in the fields of transport ... posts and telecommunications, and in
other fields." 51 Details regarding the mechanisms for achieving cooperation
were to be included in the supplementary protocols.
46 1l at 632-33.
47 Rhee, supra note 12, at 76.
48 ROHTAE Woo, RESPONSIBIIwY INKOREA: A NATIONTRANSFORMED 29,30 (1990).
49 These policy efforts are generally referred to as South Korea's "Northern Policy." See Dong-Won
Lim, Inter-Korean Relations Oriented Toward Reconciliation and Cooperation 16 KOREA AND WORLD
AHAws 213,219 (Summer 1992).
50 PoLmcs AND GOVERwMmEr IN THE FEDERAL REPmBLaC OF GERMANY: BASIC DocuMms, supra
note 1.
51 Id.
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The supplementary protocols established that the two states would de-
velop cultural cooperation by negotiating inter-governmental agreements.
Thus, the treaty created a framework for negotiation and provided a basis to
adopt mutually agreeable provisions. The protocols also explicitly
identified the need "to conclude an agreement on posts and
telecommunications on the basis of the Constitution of the Universal Postal
Union and the International Telecommunication Convention."5 2  The
protocols simultaneously provided both specific and general guidance
regarding the form of future inter-German agreements.
Governmental contact was formalized in Article 8 of the treaty. The
states agreed to create permanent missions in their respective capitols.
However, the treaty carefully noted that "practical questions relating to the
establishment of the Missions shall be dealt with separately." Once again,
specific aspects of the treaty were combined with general guidelines for
flexible application.
B. Reconciliation Treaty
The Reconciliation Treaty emphasizes many of the same areas for co-
operation as did the Basic Treaty. The Reconciliation Treaty is far more
specific than the Basic Treaty. The treaty contains twenty-five articles, and
identifies specific target objectives.53 Areas for inter-Korean cooperation
are identified, as well as specific dates for treaty implementation. Article 17
establishes that "both parties shall guarantee residents of their respective
areas free inter-Korean travel and contact." Article 18 further clarified the
commitment to travel, "[t]he two sides shall permit free correspondence,
meetings and visits between dispersed family members and other relatives
and shall promote the voluntary reunion of divided families and shall take
measures to resolve other humanitarian issues." 54
Thus, in comparison with the Basic Treaty's vague commitment to
promote "cultural cooperation" which developed into agreements regarding
inter-German travel, the Reconciliation Treaty established an irrefutable
commitment to achieve inter-Korean travel.
The same pattern of specificity is evident in the area of inter-Korean
communications. Article 20 establishes that "[b]oth parties shall establish
and link facilities needed for South-North postal and telecommunications
52 Id.
53 Full Text of Reconciliation Treaty, supra note 2.
54 Source Material supra note 2.
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services and shall guarantee the confidentiality of inter-Korean mail and
telecommunications.-t 55
Of the three areas of comparison, this seems to be the most similar to
the Basic Treaty. The supplementary protocols to the Basic Treaty did iden-
tify specific mechanisms for agreement. Although the Reconciliation Treaty
does not rely on international treaties as a basis for agreement as did the
Basic Treaty, the specific objectives of confidentiality and accessibility are
also identified. Specific objectives regarding inter-governmental contact are
also part of the Reconciliation Treaty.
The Reconciliation Treaty identifies several aspects of implementing
improved mechanisms for inter-Korean contact. First, Article 22 states that
"both parties shall establish joint committees for specific sectors... within
three months of the effective date of this agreement." 56 Beyond identifying
committees as the primary method for implementation, Article 23
establishes that "a South-North exchanges and cooperation subcommittee
shall be established within the framework of the inter-Korean high-level
talks within one month of the effective date of this agreement.. ."57 Thus,
not only were committees essential to the implementation process, but
unlike the Basic Treaty, the Reconciliation Treaty identifies specific duties
of certain committees. Second, Article 7 states that "a South-North liaison
office shall be established at Panmunjom within three months of the
effective date of the agreement."58 This aspect is similar to the Basic Treaty
in that it identifies the location of permanent missions, however, the
establishment of a three month time limit is a different approach with
respect to implementing the treaty provisions.
V. TREATY IMPLEMENTATION
A. Cross-border Travel
The implementation of the provisions in both treaties is a basis for
comparing the relative effectiveness of the Korean and German treaty
process. The first area of analysis is travel between the countries. The
Basic Treaty succeeded in promoting inter-German travel. Travel between
East and West Germany had existed prior to the 1970s, but only on a limited
55 Id.
56 lad
57 Id
58 Id.
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basis.59 After adoption of the Basic Treaty, the West German government
encouraged its citizens to travel to the GDR. The ability to travel provided
many West Germans the first opportunity to visit family in East Germany.
During the 1970s, visits to the GDR increased by 158 percent. 60 Except for
two periods when East Germany increased the amount of currency West
Germans would have to buy when entering the country, the number of
individuals visiting East Germany increased steadily over the decade
following the Basic Treaty.61 Although the East German government
limited travel to cases of "urgent family business" (including weddings,
family illness, or deaths), the number of visitors to West Germany also
increased as a result of the Basic Treaty. 62
West Germany openly welcomed visiting East Germans as part of a
single nation. The visitors from the GDR were permitted by the East
German government to take only a limited amount of currency to the West.
The result was that most visitors needed to rely on friends and family in the
West for support during their stay. The West German government did
provide visitors an annual gift of 100 West German marks, and free medical
coverage while in West Germany.63 The policy helped promote a positive
feeling toward the West German governmental system.
Visitation to West Germany enabled those in the East to personally
experience life in the Federal Republic.64 The policy helped maintain a
feeling of common nationality. Many East Germans discovered both a
common heritage and culture with West Germany.65 Exposure to the West
German governmental institutions created familiarity with the effects of
democratic government, and allowed the East Germans to become
comfortable with West German political institutions.
In contrast to implementation of the Basic Treaty, the specific
Reconciliation Treaty objectives of achieving inter-Korean travel have yet
to be realized. The issue currently remains unresolved, and there are no
plans to accomplish free travel.66 Even prior to the Basic Treaty, the East
59 David Childs, The SED Faces the Challenges of Ostpolitik and Glastnost in EAST GERMANY IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECnVE 1, 5 (David Childs et al. eds., 1989).
60 ERNEST D. PLOCK, THE BAsic TEATY AND THE EVoLUTION OF EAST-WEST GERMAN RELATIoNS
117 (1986).
61 Id. at 200.
62 Childs, supra note 59, at 6.
63 Id. at 7.
64 Gregory McCurdy, German Reunification: Historical and Legal Roots of Germany's Rapid
Progress Towards Unity, 22 INT'L LAW AND POLmCS 253, 285 (1990).
65 Gerald R. Kleinfeld, The German Question, Yesterday and Tomorrow in TH FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY ATFORTY 19,28 (Peter H. Merkl ed., 1989).
66 Kihl, supra note 45, at 634.
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German government allowed some limited travel by family members in the
West. In contrast, North Korea has never allowed visitations of any type
from the South. Attempts to renew Red Cross talks, originally begun in
1972, regarding cross-border visits of elderly Koreans have been rejected by
North Korea.67 A major factor in the impasse has been the South Korean
desire to link inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities with the
implementation of inter-Korean travel provisions.68 South Korean Prime
Minister, Chung Won-Shik, stated "it is regrettable that such urgent issues
like the nuclear problem and the reunion of separated families are left
unresolved... I hope the two sides will promptly fmd solutions to these
issues."69
The Korean treaty provisions regarding travel seemed to be an un-
qualified success at the time the treaty was adopted. However, in practice
inter-Korean travel has been problematic to implement. The importance of
this issue on the larger North-South relationship should not be overlooked.
The North-South talks collapsed in the 1970s following the inability to im-
plement cross-border visits. The issue has remained a source of continued
disagreement.
B. Mechanisms for Communication
Prior to the Basic Treaty, telephone contact between East and West
Germany remained limited. Until 1971 telephone communications between
East and West did not exist.70 Lack of adequate telephone lines and neglect
of equipment in the East were the primary reasons for the inadequate service
in the early 1970s.71 The Basic Treaty resulted in improved telephone serv-
ice. Studies have demonstrated a tremendous increase in contact between
individuals through the use of inter-German telephone lines.72 The German
people in both states gained access to an important means of
communication.
West German television also proved to be an important means of con-
tact between people in the German states. Although fewer than fifty percent
of East German homes had television sets in the 1960s, by the end of the
67 Seoul Pyongyang Sign Pact Aimed at Closer Understanding, Kyodo News Service, Sept. 17,
1992, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library.
68 Kihl, supra note 45, at 633.
69 Diane Stormont, North and South Korea Sign Detente Pact Protocols, Reuter Library Report,
Sept. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library.
70 Childs, supra note 59, at7.
71 Il at 8.
72 Id at 7.
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1970s most people had access to television.73 Individuals in the East were
able to watch many programs broadcast in the West. Thus, East Germans
were able to view and become familiar with many aspects of life in the West
Germany. David Childs notes that access to television "... has been of
major political significance. East German leaders have complained about
the effects of Western television, refugees have commented on it, and the
attempts of the GDR's own television to be more engaging... confirm its
influence."74 Indeed, prior to reunification, East Germans were more
familiar with Western politicians from television than with their former
leaders.
Such direct cross-border communication does not currently exist be-
tween North and South Korea. Indeed, the two Koreas have achieved
limited progress. In September 1992, the two states agreed to a protocol
allowing the free exchange of information regarding their political
systems.75 Although the type of information included in the agreement is
not expansive, the agreement does in principle provide the states the ability
to exchange political information. Beyond this broad acceptance of political
information, the Koreas agreed to establish postal links.76 Although at
present mail service remains limited, insufficient time has passed to assess
the implementation of these provisions.
C. Governmental Contact
A final area of consideration is high level governmental contact be-
tween the states. The Basic Treaty established both a precedent and a
framework for further contact between high ranking political figures in East
and West Germany. Herbert Wehner, chair of the parliamentary group of
the SPD, and Wolfgang Mischnick, chair of the parliamentary group of the
FDP, were the first high level party leaders to visit SED party chairman
Honecker in East Germany.77 Throughout the 1970s several meetings
between the leaders of East and West Germany occurred. In a 1975
conference in Helsinki Chancellor Schmidt met with Honecker. A number
of other occasions were arranged throughout the next decade for leaders of
73 Id. at 9.
74 Id. at 10.
75 Teresa Watanabe, Koreas Sign Wide-Ranging Accords, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1992, at A(13),
available in LEXIS, ASLAPC Library.
76 lad
77 Childs, supra note 59, at 8.
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the two states to come together. By the mid-1980s trips to the GDR by
West German political leaders had become a routine occurrence.
78
Further governmental contacts were conducted through the creation of
specialized governmental agencies responsible for implementing treaty
provisions. The function of these agencies was to resolve any conflicts
which arose, and provide a basis for creating mutual trust by enhancing East
German confidence in the implementation process.79 The establishment of
permanent missions provided a source for constant contact between East and
West and helped open the diplomatic relationship. Although ambassadors
were not exchanged, the permanent missions effectively resulted in similar
types of governmental exchanges. 80
The Reconciliation Treaty enabled North and South Korea to
establish similar formal channels for direct governmental contact. Based
upon the Reconciliation Treaty, North and South Korea established four
joint commissions responsible for specified areas of treaty
implementation.8 1 Four primary commissions are devoted to establish
military exchanges, economic exchanges social and cultural exchanges, and
general areas of reconciliation. 82  The commissions consist of
representatives from both governments and are designed to promote
continued progress. Beyond the commissions, meetings between the Prime
Ministers have been scheduled at regular intervals. The site of the meetings
alternates between the two countries.
This regulated plan for high level governmental contact has produced
tangible results. A primary result was the adoption of the previously men-
tioned protocols of September 1992, which further clarified areas and
mechanisms for North-South cooperation. 83 Recent tensions arising from
the nuclear issue have at least temporarily stopped these high level
meetings.
VI. ANALYTICAL COMPARISON
In order to compare the Basic Treaty and the Reconciliation Treaty, it
is essential to evaluate the general approach taken in both documents. The
78 Id. at 8.
79 Cordel, supra note 36, at 47.
80 Id at41-43.
81 Pyongyang, Seoul Enter Stage ofImplementing Basic Accord on Reconciliation, Nonaggression&
Exchange, 258 KOREAN REPORT 1 (Sept. 1992).
82 Stormont, supra note 69.
83 Seoul, Pyongynag Sign Pact Aimed at Closer Understanding, supra note 67.
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Basic Treaty established a broad framework for inter-German reconciliation,
while the Reconciliation Treaty identified specific areas for reconciliation
along with a time table for implementing those measures.
A. Germany's Flexible Approach to Reconciliation
Each German state claimed to be the single representative of the
German nation.84 This conflict was the fundamental source of antagonism
between the German states.85 The hostile relationship could only be altered
if each state formally recognized the existence of the other Germany. The
Basic Treaty marked a fundamental change in the West German policy
toward the East. West Germany deviated from its previous policy of non-
recognition by accepting the existence of the East German state. By
acknowledging the existence of the East German government, West
Germany created a climate for improving inter-German relations.
Although many in the West felt that the Federal Republic had
conceded too much in the Basic Treaty, 86 the West German government
maintained that improving relations would facilitate the eventual
development of a single German state.87 The long-term objective of
reunification allowed the Federal Republic to work with East Germany in an
effort to promote cooperation. Thus, West Germany ignored the
fundamental differences which had been at the center of previous inter-
German hostilities, and instead attempted to improve the relationship.
Even with the significant progress of the Basic Treaty, conflicts and
setbacks arose. As a result, evidence of the improving relationship was not
uniform. Following improvements related to travel by West Germans into
the East, the East German government increased the amount of money West
Germans would have to exchange into East German currency. 88 The policy
increased the financial burden on West Germans wishing to visit the East
and provided the East German government with additional access to the
valuable West German currency. The policy marked a period of setback for
inter-German cooperation, but eventually further progress was achieved.
89
The German experience demonstrates that strategies which ignore
84 TLFORD, supra note 23, at 8.
85 LAQIER, supra note 25, at 410-13.
86 McCurdy, supra note 64, at 267-7 1.
87 GERHARD KuNz, GERMAN OsTmOur: ITS GOALS AND FOUNDATIONS IN WEST GERMAN
FOREoNPOLUCY: DILEMMASANDDmorINS53, 53-56 (1982).
88 PLOCK, supra note 60, at 45.
89 FREY, supra note 28.
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fundamental differences between divided states can still provide a solid
basis for long-term cooperation.
The Basic Treaty's general objective of achieving inter-German coop-
eration was a vague and flexible goal. The article 7 language referring to in-
ter-German cooperation was sufficiently ambiguous to allow West Germany
to claim success on issues most important to it. For example, inter-German
travel was a major achievement of the improving relationship. Although the
shift in governmental policy was not universally accepted in the West, the
opportunity to engage in direct contact with citizens in the East was widely
supported by West Germans. Following the Basic Treaty, a significant
number of further agreements regarding travel, communications, and
governmental contact were implemented. As a result, the West German
government was able to declare the Basic Treaty a success.
Although the Basic Treaty resulted in concrete improvement immedi-
ately following its implementation, the late 1970s and early 1980s marked a
period of relative stagnation in the inter-German relationship.90 The
dramatic political changes in Eastern Europe during 1989 set the stage for
German reunification. The policies implemented as a result of the Basic
Treaty remained largely intact and provided an essential foundation for
inter-German contact. Without such a period of contact, reunification would
have remained only a distant objective.
B. Korea's Specific Plan for Reconciliation
The inter-Korean relationship has been marked by many of the same
types of hostilities as those which existed in Germany. The primary source
of contention in the inter-Korean negotiations is unique to the Korean
Peninsula. The possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea has
remained the main source of South Korean concern. 91 South Korea has long
desired to limit and control North Korea's nuclear weapons capability.
Although some efforts have been made to reach an agreement on the issue,
North Korea's continued unwillingness to allow South Korean inspection
has severely hindered the implementation of the Reconciliation Treaty.92
North and South Korea have both indicated that addressing the
nuclear issue remains a prerequisite for improving inter-Korean relations. 93
90 Kleinfeld, supra note 65, at 19.
91 Ilpyong J. Kim, Prospects for Change in North Korea's Strategy Toward the South, 23 KOREA
OBSERVER 501,513 (Winter 1992).
92 Stormont, supra note 69.
93 Kim, supra note 91.
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South Korea is unwilling to move forward with the Reconciliation Treaty
provisions until an agreement regarding the nuclear weapon issue can be
reached.94 The schedule of future inter-Korean talks regarding treaty
implementation has been postponed due to this issue.95 South Korea's
position, therefore, requires a different strategy than that followed by West
Germany.
South Korea has hindered implementation of treaty provisions due to
the nuclear issue,96 yet has not provided any concessions to the North
Korean government on the primary issue of inter-Korean contention.
Admittedly, concessions regarding the legitimate existence of East Germany
and the nuclear issue in North Korea are not equivalent security concerns.
The real and obvious threat to South Korea should not be ignored.
Despite failure to reach bilateral agreement on nuclear inspections,
North Korea agreed to important international safeguards. The Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty was signed by North Korea in 1985. North Korea
also allowed a nuclear inspection by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (LAEA) in May 1992.97 Such progress on the nuclear issue should
allow South Korea to implement some of the Reconciliation Treaty
provisions prior to complete bilateral agreement regarding nuclear
inspections. A policy of flexibility should be followed in order to establish
a basis for mutual compromise regarding the nuclear issue.
South Korea's present policy of precondition currently shows little
chance of bringing about a change in the North Korean position. On March
12, 1993, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.98 The resumption of the annual United States-South
Korean joint military exercise known as "Team Spirit" was cited as the
primary cause for North Korea's withdrawal. 99 The military exercise had
been canceled in 1992 as a gesture of inter-Korean reconciliation, but
impatience with the nuclear inspection issue resulted in South Korean
support for resumption of the joint exercise.100 Despite the obvious risk to
94 Tery McCarthy, Koreas TalkAcross a Tense Divide, THEINDNDENT, Dec. 27, 1991, at 9.
95 Hyuk-kyo Suh, Obstacles Impede Implementation of the Agreement on Reconciliation, 15
KOREAN REPORT 1, 18 (Summer 1992).
96 John Chung Hwan Oh, Political Unification and the South-North Korean Non-Aggression Treaty,
23 KOREA OBsERVER 467, 477 (Winter 1992).
97 Taewoo Kim, South Korea's Nuclear Dilemmas, 16 KOREA AND WORLD AFFAIRS 250, 254(Summer 1992).
98 DPRK Decides to WithdrawfromNPT, 272 KOREAN REPORT 1, Mar. 1993, at 1.
99 Id at 3.
100 North Korea Says Team Spirit Test for Nuclear War, Reuter Library Report, Jan. 27, 1993,
available in LEXIS, ASLAPC Library.
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the inter-Korean relationship, South Korea used the military exercise as a
means of pressuring North Korea to accept inspection of its nuclear
facilities. 101 Unfortunately, South Korea's tactic "had the reverse effect by
steeling the embittered North Korean government against further
compromise."'1 02 Although North Korea has again agreed to abide by the
terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,103 the temporary crisis
demonstrated the futility of South Korean policy efforts based solely on
coercion.
North and South Korea have been locked into a confrontational
implementation structure based on zero-sum negotiations, because of
specific provisions in the Reconciliation Treaty. Neither side can back away
from previously stated policy objectives without appearing to be giving in to
the wishes of the other side. As a result, the two Korea's are unlikely to
progress from the present state of their relationship. The positions of each
state are firmly established, and often directly contradict those espoused by
the other state. The Korean states have created a negotiation structure
doomed to failure, by linking progress on treaty issues to the resolution of
the largest area of disagreement.
Establishing specific time periods for implementation of the
Reconciliation Treaty provisions has resulted in a negotiation process prone
to failure. Predictably, unexpected areas of disagreement have arisen. The
previous hostile relationship between the two Koreas virtually guarantees
the development of continuing areas of disagreement. Complex negotiation
of such difficult issues is bound to be a time consuming process. The
setbacks weaken the overall process since the urgency of negotiation has
been lost because the implementation timetable has not been reached.
Despite this use of specific time periods, the Reconciliation Treaty should
be used as the primary mechanism for promoting inter-Korean contact. The
Korean states need to look beyond the specific implementation time
schedule and instead focus on the treaty's policy objectives.
101 DPRK Decides to Withdraw from NPT, supra note 98, at 3.
102 Id
103 Leonard S. Spector, Nonproliferation's Balance Sheet, CHnuSTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 28,
1993, at 19.
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VII. RESULTS OF TREATY IMPLEMENTATION
A. The German Experience
Implementation of the Basic Treaty enabled the citizens in both states
to retain a feeling of common identity. Despite years of separation,
increased contact following the early 1970s allowed Germans on both sides
of the border to retain a shared interest in the future of Germany. 104 The
influx of East Germans into West Germany near the end of 1989
demonstrated the strong desire of East Germans to be part of a single
German state.105 As a result of the media and travel contacts with the West,
East Germans were familiar with the West German political institutions.
Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, East Germans were more familiar
with the leaders of the West German political parties than with the party
leaders of their own country. 106
The push for reunification seemed to gain a momentum of its own as
those in the East accepted West Germany as their homeland. As
reunification approached, it became evident that the single German state
would be simply an enlargement of the existing West German political and
economic structure. 107 The West German political parties absorbed the
previous East German political party structure, and the democratic structures
of the West were formally recognized.
The acceptance of West German political structures by Germans on
both sides of the border was indicated by the reunification through existing
West German institutions. Rather than creating the type of German confed-
eration which had long been suggested as the only reasonable approach to
German reunification, 108 East Germans accepted assimilation into the West
German state structure. Even though the West German constitution
provided for the creation of a new constitution in the event of reunification,
the existing constitutional document (the Basic Law) was accepted as
binding.109 The East German territory was accepted into the government
104 JOACHIM NAWROCIU, RELATIONS BETWEEN TE TWO STATES IN GERMANY: TRENDS,
PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS 54-55 (1985).
105 Elizabeth Pond, A Wall Destroyed- The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR 36
INTERNAmTONAL SE URrrY 35, 65 (1990).
106 Id at 65.
107 Id
108 Manfred Rexin, The GDR on the Way to Germany, 41 AuSSENPOLITXK 318,326 (No. 4 1990).
109 MeCurdy, supra note 64.
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structure with the existing Lander (states) being given equal representation
in the unified national government.110
B. The Korean Experience
The Korean experience still stands in stark contrast to the documented
developments in Germany. Sporadic implementation of the Reconciliation
Treaty has yet to create a basis for inter-Korean contact. 1 Progress regard-
ing travel has not been achieved because South Korea is unwilling to
proceed with inter-Korean visitation agreements until North Korea agrees to
nuclear weapons inspection. The protocol agreements adopted in September
1992 marked a hopeful development in the inter-Korean relationship.11 2
Progress in those areas has yet to be realized. Future prospects for
implementing the treaty provisions seem bleak. The scheduled ministerial
meetings for December 1992 were postponed and the negotiation process
has slowed.113 The most solid level of inter-Korean contact, the high level
government meetings, has been hampered by recent disagreements.
The isolationist position of North Korea will continue to block treaty
implementation efforts unless South Korea is willing to seek treaty compli-
ance without linking it to nuclear weapons and security issues. Even though
North Korea lost much of its historical support following the disintegration
of the Soviet Union and the thawing of the China-South Korean relation-
ship, North Korea seems willing to continue its isolationist strategies. There
is little indication that North Korea will suddenly agree to South Korean
demands regarding nuclear weapons.
It would be impractical to suggest South Korea should ignore these
vital security issues, but South Korea should not condition all areas of inter-
Korean progress on the resolution of security concerns. The nuclear issue
may be resolved by South Korea and Washington refraining from pushing
too hard or publicly for North Korean submission.114 South Korea should
seek progress in those areas outlined by the Reconciliation Treaty while
simultaneously seeking further understanding on security issues.
Peaceful unification is not likely until basic contact between the
populace in both Korean states is established. Any unification process
110 Jochen Abr. Frowein, The Reunification of Germany, 86 AM. J. INT'LL. 152, 157-59 (1992).
111 Suh, supra note 95.
112 RoH, supra note 48, at 2.
113 Geoff Crane, Panmunjom Meltdown, ECON. REPORT 31-32 (June 1992).
114 Young Jeh Kim, The Integration of the Two Koreas: Problems and Prospects, 23 KOREA
OBsERVER 275, 300 (Autumn 1992).
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without cross-border contact will be both economically costly and
politically disruptive. Unless a common national identification is cultivated,
not only will the -populace in both states be reluctant to unify, but any
attempt to unify the states would result in political chaos. Basic contact will
provide a necessary basis upon which unification can develop. With a
common identity, the populace will be able to accept the eventual
governmental structure of a unified Korea.
Unification based on South Korean institutions is a virtual
impossibility considering the present status of the inter-Korean relationship.
North Koreans would be unwilling to accept the institutions of the South as
a basis for a unified government. Years of mutual hostility and distrust have
prevented North Korean exposure to South Korean political and economic
institutions. Although the most recent Korean discussion of unification
indicates some form of confederation between the two states is often
contemplated, it is unlikely such a confederation could be created and
accepted. The complexities of creating such a confederation from two
previously hostile states would be virtually impossible to overcome.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Analysis of the past and present state of the inter-Korean relationship
demonstrates that the Reconciliation Treaty has the potential to be used as a
solid basis for improving inter-Korean contact. The ratification of the treaty
is significant because both sides have defined areas for improving coopera-
tion. Contact in these areas can minimize the present hostility and create a
foundation for a gradually improving relationship. Practical and effective
steps taken within the treaty context can improve the inter-Korean relation-
ship and provide a basis for eventual unification.
The German experience demonstrates the unpredictability of the
unification process; however, certain basic foundations seem to be
necessary. The Basic Treaty provided practical areas for inter-German
contact. Without such contact, it is unlikely the citizens of both German
states would have been prepared to transform the political events of late
1989 into the basis for reunification.
South Korean flexibility is the key to implementing the
Reconciliation Treaty. Conditional demands on treaty implementation will
make the negotiation process even more difficult. Recent experience
involving the nuclear issue indicates such demands are likely to shut down
the entire process. Relying on changing political circumstances in the
communist world to alter the North's position is unlikely to be effective in
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achieving inter-Korean cooperation. Even though North Korea has
demonstrated a continued willingness to accept isolation, it can not ignore
the fundamental changes which have occurred in the cold war communist
world. Indeed, North Korea has tremendous economic incentives for
improving ties with the South.'1 5 Tactics designed to pressure North Korea
into accepting nuclear inspection should be abandoned in favor of efforts
designed to promote inter-Korean contact.
Although resolution of the nuclear issue will not guarantee implemen-
tation of the Reconciliation Treaty, a recognition that concrete contact in the
short-term will enhance the possibility of future unification should be an in-
centive for the South to pursue treaty implementation. Such a strategy was
successful in the West German context and the logical application of the
concept in the Korean context seems likely to succeed. South Korean
flexibility will contribute to future inter-Korean agreement and cooperation.
Implementation of treaty provisions regarding cross-border travel,
communication, and governmental contact will establish personal inter-
Korean relationships which may persist despite potential future disputes
between North and South Korea.
The North and South Korean states have remained nominally commit-
ted to the notion of unification. The pace and eventual structure of a single
Korean state remains uncertain. Peaceful unification requires a common vi-
sion by a substantial portion of the citizens on both sides of the border
regarding the accepted form of governmental institutions. Unless the two
states can implement the Reconciliation Treaty provisions, a consensus on a
single governmental structure is unlikely. Until the states can begin to form
a new relationship based upon cooperation and understanding, the ideal of
unification will remain an unrealistic political objective.
115 Oh, supra note 96, at 477-81.
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